Abstract. Concurrent Zero-Knowledge protocols remain zero-knowledge even when many sessions of them are executed together. These protocols have applications in a distributed setting, where many executions of the same protocol must take place at the same time by many parties, such as the Internet. In this paper, we are concerned with the numberof rounds of interaction needed for such protocols and their e ciency. Here, we show an e cient constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocol with preprocessing for all languages in NP, where both the preprocessing phase and the proof phase each require 3 rounds of interaction. We make no timing assumptions or assumptions on the knowledge of the number of parties in the system. Moreover, we allow arbitrary interleavings in both the preprocessing and in the proof phase. Our techniques apply to both zero-knowledge proof systems and zero-knowledge arguments and we show how to extend our technique so that polynomial number of zero-knowledge proofs arguments can be executed after the preprocessing phase is done.
Introduction
The notion of zero-knowledge proof systems was introduced in the seminal paper of Goldwasser, Micali and Racko 18 . Since their introduction, zero-knowledge proofs have proven to be very useful as a building block in the construction of cryptographic protocols, especially after Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson 17 have shown that all languages in NP admit zero-knowledge proofs. Due to their importance, the e ciency of zero-knowledge protocols has received considerable attention. One of the aspects of e ciency is the number of rounds of interaction necessary for zero-knowledge proofs, and it was shown that there exist computational zero-knowledge proofs with a constant n umber of rounds for all languages in NP by Goldreich and Kahan 16 . Previous work. Recently, a lot of attention has been paid to the setting where many concurrent executions of the same protocol take place say, on the Internet. For example, in the context of identi cation schemes, this was discussed by Beth and Desmedt 3 . In the context of zero-knowledge, Di Crescenzo constructed proof systems that remain zero-knowledge in a synchronous setting without timing or complexity assumptions 8 . The general case of concurrent zero-knowledge in an asynchronous setting was considered by D w ork, Naor and Sahai 11 . They showed that assuming that there are some bounds on the relative speed of the processors, one can construct four-round zero-knowledge argument for any language in NP an argument di ers from a proof system in the fact that the soundness property holds only with respect to polynomial-time provers 4 . Dwork and Sahai improved this result by reducing the use of timing assumptions to a preprocessing phase 12 . Preprocessing was rst used in the context of zero-knowledge proofs by De Santis, Micali and Persiano 7 . Recently, Richardson and Kilian 24 presented concurrent zero-knowledge protocols for all languages in NP that do not use timing assumption but require more then constant n umber of rounds of interaction. More speci cally, given a security parameter k, Richardson and Kilian's protocol requires Ok rounds and allows polyk concurrent executions. A negative result was given by Kilian, Petrank and Racko 20 , who showed that if there exists a 4-round protocol that is concurrent black-box simulation zero-knowledge for some language L then L is in BPP.
Our results. We consider a distributed model with a preprocessing phase and a proof phase. In this setting, we show h o w, based on complexity assumptions, and after a three-round pre-processing stage, three-round concurrent zero-knowledge proofs and arguments can be constructed for all languages in NP. Our protocol does not require any timing assumptions nor knowledge of the number of parties in the system nor knowledge of the total number of concurrent executions. In the case of proof systems, our protocol is based on the existence of perfectly secure commitment s c hemes, it is computational zero-knowledge and applies to all public-coin zero-knowledge proof systems. In the case of arguments, our protocol is based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms modulo primes and it is perfect zero-knowledge. The requirement that we make which is di erent than in the work of Dwork and Sahai 12 is that all the concurrent executions of the pre-processing subprotocols nish before the concurrent executions of the proof protocols begin, although we allow arbitrary interleaving both in the pre-processing and in the proof phase. A di erent i n terpretation of our result is that we do not make a n y timing assumptions, but require a single synchronization barrier" between the pre-processing stage and the main proof stage of the protocol, where all parties nish the pre-processing stage before the main stage begins. We believe that this setting may be of interest in several applications, since the pre-processing stage does not need the knowledge of the theorems to be proved in the main phase of the protocol. Tools used. An important tool used in the construction of our schemes is that of equivocable commitment s c hemes, which w e consider in two v ariants: computationally and perfectly equivocable. The computational variant w as rst discussed by Beaver in 1 , and a rst construction was given by Di Crescenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky in 9 in the common random string model using a scheme by Naor 21 . Here we present a computationally equivocable and a perfectly equivocable commitment s c hemes in the interactive model, based on bit commitment schemes by Naor 21 and Pedersen 23 , respectively. These schemes might b e o f independent interest and may h a ve further applications, such as for identi cation schemes. We remark that a somewhat weaker version of our results could be alternatively derived by considering in our model appropriate modi cations of techniques based on coin ipping and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, as those used in 24, 12, 13 , resulting with even smaller round-complexity. H o wever, our techniques apply to perfect zero-knowledge arguments and o er additional e ciency properties since they do not use general NP reductions. Another tool we use is that of straight-line simulation, as formally de ned by D w ork and Sahai 12 and also used by F eige and Shamir 14 .
Notations and De nitions
In this section we give basic notations, we recall the notions of interactive proof systems, zero-knowledge proof systems in the two-party model and formally de ne concurrent zero-knowledge proof systems with preprocessing.
Probabilistic setting. The notation x S denotes the random process of selecting element x uniformly from set S. Similarly, the notation y Ax, where A is an algorithm, denotes the random process of obtaining y when running algorithm A on input x, where the probability space is given by the random coins if any of algorithm A. B y fR 1 ; : : : ; R n : vg we denote the set of values v that a random variable can assume, due to the distribution determined by the sequence of random processes R 1 ; : : : ; R n . By Prob R 1 ; : : : ; R n : E w e denote the probability of event E, after the ordered execution of random processes R 1 ; : : : ; R n .
Interactive protocols. Following 18 , an interactive Turing machine i s a T uring machine with a public input tape, a public communication tape, a private random tape and a private work tape. An interactive protocol is a pair of interactive T uring machines sharing their public input tape and communication tape. The transcript of an execution of an interactive protocol A,B is a sequence containing the random tape of B and all messages appearing on the communication tape of A and B. The notation y 1 ; y 2 Ax 1 ; Bx 2 x denotes the random process of running interactive protocol A,B, where A has private input x 1 , B has private input x 2 , x is A and B's common input, y 1 is A's output and y 2 is B's output, where any o f x 1 ; x 2 ; y 1 ; y 2 ; x can be an empty string; the notation y Ax 1 ; Bx 2 x is an abbreviation for y;y Ax 1 ; Bx 2 x. We assume wlog that the output of both parties A and B at the end of an execution of protocol A,B contains a transcript of the communication exchanged between A and B during such execution. An interactive protocol with preprocessing is a pair of interactive protocols A1,B1,A2,B2. The mechanics of an interactive protocol with preprocessing is divided in two phases, as follows. In a rst phase, called the preprocessing phase, the rst pair A1,B1 is executed; at the end of this phase a string is output by A1 and given as private input to A2, and a string is output by B1 and given as private input to B2. Now, an input string x is given as common input to A2 and B2, and the second pair A2,B2 is executed. In this paper we will be concerned with two types of interactive protocols: proof systems and arguments, which w e n o w describe.
Interactive proof systems and arguments. An interactive proof system for a language L is an interactive protocol in which, on input a string x, a computationally unbounded prover convinces a polynomial-time bounded veri er that x belongs to L. The requirements are two: completeness and soundness.
Informally, completeness states that for any input x 2 L, the prover convinces the veri er with very high probability. Soundness states that for any x 6 2 L and any prover, the veri er is convinced with very small probability. A formal de nition can be found in 18, 15 . An argument is de ned similarly to a proof system, the only di erence being that the prover is assumed to be polynomially bounded see 4 . Zero-knowledge proof systems in the two-party model. A zero-knowledge proof system for a language L is an interactive proof system for L in which, for any x 2 L, and any possibly malicious probabilistic polynomial-time veri er V 0 , no information is revealed to V 0 that he could not compute alone before running the protocol. This is formalized by requiring, for each V 0 , the existence of an e cient simulator S V 0 which outputs a transcript`indistinguishable' from the view of V 0 in the protocol. There exist three notions of zero-knowledge, according to the level of indistinguishability: computational, statistical and perfect. We refer the reader to 18, 15 for the de nitions of computational, statistical and perfect indistinguishability b e t ween distributions and for the de nitions of computational, statistical and perfect zero-knowledge proof systems.
The concurrent model for zero-knowledge proof systems. Informally speaking, the concurrent model describes a distributed model in which several parties can run concurrent executions of some protocols. In real-life distributed system, the communication is not necessarily synchronized; more generally, the model makes the worst-case assumption that the communication in the system happens in an asynchronous manner; this means that there is no xed bound on the amount of time that a message takes to arrive t o its destination. This implies that, for instances, the order in which messages are received during the execution of many concurrent protocols can be arbitrarily di erent from the order in which they were sent. Such v ariation in the communication model poses a crucial complication into designing a zero-knowledge protocol, since the possibly arbitrary interleaving of messages can help some adversary to break the zero-knowledge property. In fact, as a worst case assumption, one may assume that the ordering in which messages are received can be decided by the adversary. Now w e proceed more formally. We consider a distributed model, with two distinguished sets of parties: a set P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P q g of provers and a set V = fV 1 ; : : : ; V q g of veri ers, where P i is connected to V i , for i = 1 ; : : : ; q . Let A,B be a zero-knowledge proof system. At any time a veri er V i may decide to run protocol A,B; therefore, for any xed time, there may be several pairs of prover and veri er running A,B. The adversary A is allowed to corrupt all the veri ers. Then A can be formally described as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, given the history so far, returns an index i and a message m i , with the meaning that the corrupted veri er V i , for i 2 f 1; : : : ; q g, is sending message m i to prover P i . W e assume wlog that P i is required to send his next message after receiving m i and before receiving a new message from A. W e n o w de ne the view of the adversary A. First we de ne a qconcurrent execution of A,B as the possibly concurrent execution of q instances of protocol A,B, where all veri ers are controlled by A. Also, we de ne the q-concurrent transcript of a q-concurrent execution of A,B as a sequence containing the random tapes of veri ers V 1 ; : : : ; V q and all messages appearing on the communication tapes of P 1 ; : : : ; P q and V 1 ; : : : ; V q , where the ordering of such messages is determined by the adversary corrupting all the veri ers. The notation T ; y 11 ; y 12 ; : : : ; y 1q ; y 2q P 1 p 1 ; V 1 v 1 x 1 ; : : : ; P q p q ; V q v q x q denotes the random process of running a q-concurrent execution of interactive protocol A,B, where each P i has private input x i , each V i has private input v i , x i is P i and V i 's common input, y 1i is P i 's output, y 2i is V i 's output, and T is the q-concurrent transcript of such execution we assume wlog that the output of both parties P i and V i at the end of an execution of the interactive protocol A,B contains a transcript of the communication exchanged between P i and V i during such execution. Then the view of A, denoted as V iew A x, is the transcript T output by the random process T ; y 11 ; y 12 ; : : : ; y 1q ; y 2q P 1 p 1 ; Av 1 x 1 ; : : : ; P q p q ; Av q x q , where x = x 1 ; : : : ; x q . Finally, a proof system A,B for language L is concurrent zero-knowledge if for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, there exists an e cient algorithm S A such that for any polynomial q, and any x 1 ; : : : ; x q , where q = qn, and jx 1 j = = jx q j = n, the two distributions S A x and V iew A x are indistinguishable.
Concurrent zero-knowledge proof systems with preprocessing. We n o w consider a variant of the above distributed model, in which we would like to consider concurrent zero-knowledge proof systems with preprocessing. In this variant a concurrent execution of an interactive protocol with preprocessing A1,B1,A2,B2 is divided into two phases: a preprocessing phase and a proof phase. In the preprocessing phase there is a concurrent execution in the sense de ned before of the preprocessing pair A1,B1 and in the proof phase there is a concurrent execution of the proof pair A2,B2. The requirements are, as before, completeness, soundness and concurrent zero-knowledge. Now w e give a formal de nition of concurrent zero-knowledge proof systems with preprocessing.
De nition 1. Let A,B=A1,B1,A2,B2 be an interactive protocol with preprocessing. We say that A,B is a concurrent computational statistical perfect zero-knowledge proof system with preprocessing for language L if the following holds: denotes the view of A on input x = x 1 ; : : : ; x q , and where P 1 ; : : : ; P q run algorithms A1 in the preprocessing phase and A2 in the proof phase.
3 Cryptographic tools and a class of languages
We brie y review some cryptographic tools as commitment schemes and coin ipping protocols. Then we discuss a class of languages having a certain type of zero-knowledge protocols, which will be used in this paper.
Commitment s c hemes. Informally speaking, a commitment scheme Alice,Bob is a two-phase interactive protocol between two probabilistic polynomial time parties Alice and Bob, called the sender and the receiver, respectively, such that the following is true. Alice commits to his bit b in the rst phase called the commitment phase; in the second phase called the decommitment phase Alice convinces Bob of the value of the bit b Alice had committed to in the rst phase if Bob is not convinced, he outputs a special string ?. A commitment scheme has three requirements. First, if Alice and Bob behave honestly, then at the end of the decommitment phase Bob is convinced that Alice had committed to bit b with high probability this is the correctness requirement. Then, no matter which polynomial-time computable strategy Bob uses in the commitment phase, Bob is not able to guess such bit with probability signi cantly better than its a priori probability at the end of such phase this is the security property. Finally, for any strategy played by Alice, the probability that he can later decommit both as 0 and as 1 is negligible this is the binding property. There are two main variants of commitment s c hemes in the literature, with respect to the type of security guaranteed: computationally secure i.e., the security property holds against a polynomial time bounded receiver, while the binding property holds against an unrestricted sender and perfectly secure i.e., security holds against an unrestricted receiver, while binding holds against polynomial time bounded sender. In this paper we will consider both variants.
Coin ipping protocols. A coin ipping protocol 5 is a protocol among two parties, Alice and Bob, who exchange messages. At the end of the protocol, both parties have a bit that is uniformly distributed, no matter how each of them tries to in uence its distribution. Standard constructions for coin ipping protocols are obtained by using bit commitment s c hemes, as follows. Alice commits to a random bit a, Bob sends a random bit b to Alice, then Alice reveals her bit a; the result of the coin ipping protocol is c = a b. Three-round public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge protocols. We will consider a class of languages having a special type of zero-knowledge protocol; namely, a protocol having the following properties: 1 the protocol has three rounds; namely, the prover sends a message called rst message to the veri er, the veri er sends a message called challenge to the prover, the prover sends anal message called answer to the veri er who decides whether to accept or not; 2 it is public-coin; namely, the challenge consists of some random bits sent b y the veri er; 3 it is honest-veri er zero-knowledge; namely, the zero-knowledge requirement holds only with respect to a veri er which follows its program. In the literature there are several examples of protocols satisfying the above properties, and the class of languages having such protocols is quite large. For instance, all languages in NP have a computational zero-knowledge proof system e.g., 17, 5 with these properties, and all random self-reducible languages and formula compositions over them have perfect zero-knowledge proof systems with these properties 18, 17, 25, 6 .
Equivocable commitment schemes
We recall the notion of equivocable commitment s c hemes, by presenting two v ariants of them: computationally and perfectly equivocable commitment s c hemes. Then we present an example of a computationally equivocable commitment scheme under the assumption of the existence of any one-way permutation and an example of a perfectly equivocable commitment s c heme under the assumption of intractability of computing discrete logarithms.
De nition of equivocable commitment s c hemes. Informally speaking, a bit commitment s c heme is equivocable if it satis es the following additional requirement. There exists an e cient algorithm, called the simulator, which outputs a transcript leading to a`fake' commitment such that: a the`fake' commitment can be decommitted both as 0 and as 1, and b the simulated transcript is indistinguishable from a real execution of the protocol. The extension to equivocable string commitment s c hemes is straightforward. The two t ypes of equivocability, computational and perfect, di er according to the type of indistinguishability i n b. A formal de nition follows.
De nition 2. Let A,B be a commitment s c heme. We s a y that A,B is computationally equivocable resp., perfectly equivocable if for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm B 0 , there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm M such that:
1. Equivocability. For all constants c, all su ciently large n, any string s 2 f0; 1g k , where k = kn for some polynomial k, it holds that jp 0 , p 1 j n ,c , where p 0 ; p 1 are, respectively, Prob ; M B 0 1 n ; 1 k ; t; t; v M B 0 ; s; 1 n : v = s ; Prob ; As; B 0 1 n ; 1 k ; t; t; v A ; s; B 0 1 n ; 1 k : v = s : resp., it holds that p 0 = p 1 .
2. Indistinguishability. For any string s 2 f0; 1g k , where k = kn for some polynomial k, the distributions TM and TA are computationally resp., perfectly indistinguishable, where TM = f ; M B 0 1 n ; 1 k ; t; t; s M B 0 ; s; 1 n : ;t; sg; TA = f ; As; B 0 1 n ; 1 k ; t; t; s A ; s; B 0 1 n ; 1 k : ;t; sg:
Equivocable bit-commitment schemes have properties similar to chameleon or trapdoor commitment s c hemes see, e.g., 4 ; a main di erence is that in equivocable commitment s c hemes one among the two requirements of binding and security holds with respect to a computationally unlimited adversary as opposed to only polynomial-time bounded. Computationally equivocable bit-commitment schemes have been rst discussed in 1 , who observed the somewhat paradoxical requirement that such s c hemes need to satisfy. In 9 it was shown that the implementation in the common random string model of the bit commitment s c heme from 21 is computationally equivocable. Here we show in the interactive model that a variation of the scheme in 21 is a computationally equivocable commitment scheme and a variation of the scheme in 23 is a perfectly equivocable commitment s c heme.
A computationally equivocable commitment s c heme. We will present a scheme A,B by combining the scheme in 21 with a coin ipping protocol; we describe the scheme for a single bit, since the extension to a many-bit string is straightforward. The bit commitment scheme in 21 consists in a 2-round commitment phase and a 1-round decommitment phase. In the commitment phase, the receiver sends a 3n-bit random string R to the committer and the committer replies with some pseudo-random message com, where n is a security parameter. In the decommitment phase, the committer sends a decommitment message dec which allows, together with R and com, the receiver to be convinced that the committed bit was b. The variation we consider here consists in the following. First of all committer and receiver run a coin ipping protocol, whose output we denote by r. Then they continue the protocol as in 21 , but using the output r of the coin ipping protocol as string R is used in the original protocol. A more formal description follows. We will denote by n a security parameter, Proof. The correctness and the security property of A,B directly follow from those of the scheme in 21 . Now we consider the binding property. Note that since B commits to u using a perfectly-secure commitment s c heme, no in nitely powerful A 0 can guess u better than guessing at random. Therefore, for any A 0 , the distribution of u v is uniform over f0; 1g 3n , and we can directly apply the analysis of 21 to conclude that A,B satis es the binding property. N o w we show that A,B is computationally equivocable. Informally, w e present a n e cient simulator M, which can run the commitment phase in such a w ay that it can later decommit both as a 0 a n d a s a 1 . M's output is computationally indistinguishable from a real execution of A,B. Note that in M's output the result of the coin ipping protocol is equal to Gs 0 Gs 1 while in an execution of A,B such output is random. In particular, the same holds for the string sent to the receiver during the coin ipping protocol. This can be used to show, exactly as already done in 9 , that if there exists an e cient algorithm distinguishing M's output from a real execution of A,B, then there exists an e cient algorithm that distinguishes uniformly distributed strings from outputs of G. This contradicts the assumption that G is a pseudorandom generator. M can decommit both as 0 and as 1. During the execution of M there are two executions of the coin ipping protocol, one before and one after the rewinding of B 0 ; we will call them the rst and the second execution of the coin ipping protocol, respectly; we note that M can halt both during the rst and during the second execution of the coin ipping protocol because of an inappropriate decommitment b y B 0 . Instead, if the result of the second execution of the coin ipping protocol between M and B 0 is u 0 v = z 0 z 1 , then s 0 and s 1 are valid decommitment keys as 0 and 1, respectively, for the commitment com = z 0 . Therefore, the probability p 0 , as de ned in item 1 of De nition 2 is equal to the probability that the output of the second execution of the coin ipping protocol is equal to z 0 z 1 . Let us de ne probability q 1 as the probability t h a t M d o e s not halt in the rst execution of the coin ipping protocol, and probability q 0 as the probability that M halts neither in the rst nor in the second execution of the coin ipping protocol because of some inappropriate decommitment of B 0 . We n o w observe three facts.
The rst fact is that p 1 = q 1 . This follows by observing the probabilistic experiments in the de nition of p 1 and q 1 are the same; speci cally, notice that the string u is uniformly chosen and B 0 decommits properly in both experiments. The second fact we observe is that p 0 = q 0 . This follows by observing the probabilistic experiments in the de nition of p 0 and q 0 are the same; speci cally, observe that M is successful in creating a fake commitment if and only if M does not halt neither in the rst execution nor in the second execution of the coin ipping protocol.
The third fact is that q 1 , q 0 is negligible. Assume not. Then B 0 could be used to e ciently distinguish between the random string u sent b y M during the rst execution of the coin ipping protocol and the string u 0 sent b y M during the second execution since B 0 correctly decommits in the rst case and incorrectly in the second. This implies that B 0 can be, in turn, used to contradict the fact that G is a pseudo-random generator exactly as in the proof that M's output is computationally indistinguishable from a real execution of A,B, thus giving a contradiction.
By combining the above three facts, we h a ve that jp 1 , p 0 j j q 1 , q 0 j, and is therefore negligible. u t
We remark that the perfectly-secure commitment scheme C,D used in the above construction can be implemented assuming the existence of any one-way permutation using the scheme in 22 . Therefore, the weakest assumption under which the described scheme A,B is computationally equivocable is the existence of one-way permutations.
A perfectly equivocable commitment s c heme. Our perfectly equivocable scheme is based on a perfectly-secure commitment s c heme in 23 ; this scheme uses some elementary number theoretic de nition concerning discrete logarithms, which w e brie y review. The commitment scheme in 23 . Given primes p; q such that p = 2q + 1 and g;h2 G q , the commitment scheme goes as follows. In order to commit to an integer s 2 Z q , the committer uniformly chooses r 2 Z q , computes com = g s h r mod p, and sends com to the receiver. In order to decommit com as m, the committer sends s; r to the receiver, who checks that com = g s h r mod p.
The perfect security property of this scheme follows from the fact that com is uniformly distributed in G q ; the computational binding property follows from the fact that if a committer is able to successfully decommit a string com both as s and s 0 , then he can compute the discrete logarithm of h in base g.
Our variation. We consider a protocol A,B that is a variation of the above scheme, consisting in running rst a coin ipping protocol to choose g;h2 G q .
A more formal description follows. We will assume that the parties share a computationally secure commitment s c hemes C,D.
The Commitment Protocol A,B Input to A: an integer s 2 Zq. Commitment Phase: Proof. The correctness and perfect security properties directly follow from the analogue properties of the scheme in 23 . Now w e consider the binding property.
Note that since B commits to u 1 ; u 2 using a computationally secure commitment scheme, for any polynomial time A 0 , the distribution of u 1 v 1 mod p and u 2 v 2 mod p has only negligible distance from the uniform distribution. Therefore we can apply the analysis of 23 to conclude that A,B is computationally binding assuming that computing discrete logarithms modulo integers of the form p = 2 q + 1, for q prime, is intractable. The proof that A,B is perfectly equiv- u t
We remark that the assumption of intractability of computing discrete logarithms implies the existence of computationally secure commitment schemes, therefore Theorem 2 holds under the only assumption of the intractability of computing discrete logarithms.
Concurrent zero-knowledge proofs with preprocessing
In this section we consider the problem of constructing concurrent zero-knowledge proofs with preprocessing. We present a transformation which applies to all languages having a public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge proof systems, including, in particular, all languages in NP. The transformation returns a concurrent zero-knowledge proof system with preprocessing, requiring therefore no timing assumptions nor requiring the parties to know the number of users in the system. Important properties of the resulting proof system include the fact that it has round, communication and computation complexity comparable to those of the starting proof system; speci cally, our transformation does not require general NP reductions, and requires a 3-round preprocessing phase and a proof phase with a number of rounds equal to the number of rounds of the original proof system. For simplicity of description, we n o w present our result for all languages having a 3-round public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge proof system. Formally, w e a c hieve the following Theorem 3. Let L be a language having a 3-round public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge proof system. Assuming the existence of pseudo-random generators and perfectly secure commitment s c hemes, there exists constructively a concurrent computational zero-knowledge proof system with preprocessing for L where both preprocessing and proof phases require 3 rounds of communication.
The result underlying our transformation is actually stronger than what stated in the above theorem, providing, for example, additional e ciency properties; various remarks and extensions are discussed in Section 5.2. In the following, we start with an informal description of our transformation, then present a formal description of our concurrent zero-knowledge proof system and then prove its properties.
An informal description. We start by informally describing the main ideas behind our technique. First of all, we should observe that proving a protocol to be concurrent zero-knowledge becomes a problem in the presence of potentially bad interleavings among the polynomially many concurrent executions. In particular, such i n terleavings may ask the simulator for too many eventually, more than polynomial rewindings in order to be able to succeed in simulating the protocol. Therefore, we use a technique that allows to simulate part of our protocol without performing any rewinding Part of our protocol uses a special zero-knowledge property, similar to a technique used in 12 in a trustedcenter setting and in 14 in the case of arguments. This type of zero-knowledge property, formally de ned as straight-line zero-knowledge, does not require the simulator to rewind the adversary. Straight line zero-knowledge arguments have been implemented in 12 , using either a trusted center or a preprocessing phase with timing assumptions. In this paper we separate the preprocessing phases of all protocols from the proof phases of all protocols and obtain, without using timing assumptions or trusted centers, that the proof phase of our protocol is straight-line zero-knowledge. This is achieved by using the tool of equivocable commitment. Namely, the prover uses a computationally equivocable commitment s c heme to commit to some random string d, receives the challenge c from the veri er, decommits his string d and uses the string c d a s a c hallenge according to the original protocol A,B. In this way, during the simulation, he can compute such commitment k eys in a way such that he can later open them both as a 0 and as a 1. In particular, he will be able to set string d after he has seen the challenge c from the adversary. Namely, he will be able to set d in such a way that the string d c matches a challenge consistent with the rst message he has already sent and with the output of an execution of the simulator S that he had previously computed. The scheme will use the computationally equivocable commitment presented in Section 4; in particular, the coin ipping subprotocol used in that scheme will be run in the preprocessing phase of this protocol. Notice that the coin ipping protocol is not straight line simulatable, but its concurrent composition can be simulated in time at most quadratic of the number of executions, no matter which i n terleavings among them are chosen by the adversary.
Formal description. Let L be a language having a 3-round public-coin honestveri er zero-knowledge proof system A,B and let x be the common input, where jxj = n. W e denote by S the honest-veri er simulator associated to A,B, and by mes; c; ans a transcript of an execution of A,B, where mes is the rst message, c is the challenge, ans is the answer, and jcj = m. Also, let C,D be a perfectly secure commitment s c heme and let G be a pseudo-random generator.
Now w e give a formal description of the preprocessing phase subprotocol P1,V1 and the proof phase subprotocol P2,V2 of our concurrent zero-knowledge proof system with preprocessing P,V.
The Proof System P1,V1,P2,V2
Input to P1 and V1: 1 n , where n is a positive i n teger.
Instructions for P1 and V1 preprocessing phase:
6. V1 sets equal to the transcript so far and outputs: .
Input to P2: x; , where jxj = n. Input to V2: x; , where jxj = n. Instructions for P2 and V2 proof phase:
Properties of our protocol
We now prove the properties of the described protocol. Clearly the veri er's algorithms V1 and V2 can be performed in probabilistic polynomial time. The completeness requirement directly follows from the correctness of the equivocable commitment s c heme and the completeness of the protocol A,B. The soundness requirement directly follows from the perfect security of the commitment s c heme C,D and the analysis in 21 . Now w e see that the requirement of concurrent zero-knowledge is satis ed.
Concurrent Zero-Knowledge. In the following we describe an e cient simulator Sim which i n teracts with a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who corrupts all veri ers V 1 ; : : : ; V q . W e will show that for all x 1 ; : : : ; x q 2 L, the distributions Sim A x and View A x are computationally indistinguishable, where x = x 1 ; : : : ; x q .
The simulator Sim. We start with an informal description of Sim. The rst step of the simulator Sim is to run the preprocessing phase of protocol P,V, where Sim runs algorithm P1 and A runs V1. This step is done to check whether A decommits all the commitments in a proper way. If this is the case, then
Sim continues the simulation; otherwise, namely, if there exists at least one commitment that is not open properly from A, Sim outputs the transcript seen until then and halts. In this step Sim also keeps track of which v eri er sent its commitment message rst, call it V 1 , and which w ere its decommitments.
The second step of the simulator Sim consists in performing the simulation of the concurrent executions in the preprocessing phase. The algorithm Sim repeats for each v eri er V i , i 2 f 1; : : : ; q g, the following four substeps, given à current' veri er V i , and the value of its decommitted strings. First, it rewinds the adversary A until right after V i had sent its commitments. Then, using its knowledge of the decommitted strings from V i , he sends some pseudo-random strings which will allow later to send commitments that can be later opened both as 0 and as 1. Now, Sim will continue the simulation of the preprocessing phase by running the polynomial-time algorithm P1 and waiting for the next veri er sending its commitment message. Once, he has found such v eri er, he will continue the simulation of the preprocessing phase by running P1 and waiting for the decommitments by such v eri er, who becomes then the current v eri er in the next execution of these four substeps. If at any time, a veri er sends an inappropriate decommitment, Sim just halts. The third step of the simulator Sim consists in performing the simulation of the concurrent executions in the proof phase. Note that after the second step is over, if Sim has not halted, in all proofs Sim can compute commitments that he can open both as 0 and as 1. Therefore, the proof can now be simulated without rewindings of any v eri er, since, after seeing the message from the veri er, Sim can set the challenge any v alue it likes by just properly decommitting the equivocable commitments. A formal description is in Figure 5 . Sketch of Proof. We consider three cases according to whether the adversary decommits its commitments in a proper way i n v arious steps of algorithm Sim.
The rst case we consider is the one in which the adversary A always decommits its commitments in a proper way. All messages sent by A are clearly equally distributed in the simulation and in the proof since they are computed in the same way. N o w, let us consider the messages from the provers. We observe that the triple mes i ; c i ; ans i is output by the simulator S for A,B and therefore its distribution is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the same triple in the proof. The only remaining messages to consider are the strings v i;j in the preprocessing phase, the commitments z i;j; and the associated decommitments s i;j; in the proof phase. From the description of Sim and P1, we can see that the distributions of such strings are clearly di erent; for instance, the strings v i;j are random in a real proof and pseudo-random in the simulated execution. However, notice that each triple v i;j ; z i;j; ; s i;j; is part of the transcript of an execution of the computationally equivocable commitment scheme presented in Section 4. Therefore, we can directly apply Theorem 1 to conclude that the distribution of such triple in the real proof and the distribution of such triple in the simulation are computationally indistinguishable.
The second case we consider is the one in which the adversary A decommits its commitments in step 1 in a proper way but decommits in a non proper way i n one of the remaining steps of Sim. Notice that in this case Sim halts without output and therefore the two distributions di er. However we n o w see that this happens with negligible probability. Assume not; then A is able to distinguish between the rst simulated execution in which all the u i;j 's are random and the second simulated execution in which the u i;j 's are pseudo-random. In the proof of Theorem 1 we showed that in the case of a single execution of a single bit protocol, this fact implies the existence of an e cient distinguisher between a random string and the output of G, thus contradicting the assumption that G is a pseudo-random generator. A modi cation of that proof can be used here too, in the concurrent setting, where the modi cation consists in using a hybrid argument to take care of the fact that there are several strings u i;j that are random in one execution and pseudo-random in the second execution.
The last case we need to consider is the one in which the adversary A does not decommit in a proper way its commitments in step 1 of algorithm Sim. Note that if this happens the simulator Sim halts by outputting the transcript so far; this is the same view as that of A during the real proof since the prover also halts in this case; therefore, the simulation is perfect in this case. u t
Remarks and Extensions
We present some remarks and extensions of our main result, as given in Theorem 3, concerning minimal complexity assumptions, e ciency, allowing any polynomial number of proofs, and extending to any public-coin protocol. E ciency. In terms of communication and computation complexity, when applied to several 3-round public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge protocols in the literature e.g., 17, 5, 18, 25, 6 our proof system has e ciency comparable to that of the original protocol. In particular, contrarily to previously given concurrent zero-knowledge proof system, the construction of our protocol does not require any NP reduction, which could potentially blow up the parameters. Considering that our protocol is also a proof of knowledge, this may h a ve applications to identi cation schemes. Moreover, in many examples for which the original computational zero-knowledge proof system already requires a commitment scheme e.g., 17, 5 , an optimization can be performed: such protocols can be made concurrent zero-knowledge in our model by only implementing the commitment s c heme using our equivocable commitment s c heme in Section 4.
Minimal complexity assumptions. Our protocol is based on the existence of perfectly secure commitment schemes and pseudo-random generators. Both can be constructed under the assumption of the existence of collision-intractable functions, and number-theoretic assumptions as the intractability of deciding quadratic residuosity modulo composite integers.
Any polynomial number of proofs. Our proposed protocol allow s a n umber of proofs bounded by the size of the preprocessing. By combining our techniques with those in 13 for non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, we can allow a n y polynomial in the size of the preprocessing number of proofs. This variation, however, involves a general NP reduction, thus making the protocol much less e cient in terms of communication and computation complexity.
Extending to any public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge proof system. This extension is obtained by just observing that the transformation done for the challenge message in the 3-round protocol in the proof of Theorem 3 can be performed to all public-coin messages from the veri er. In particular, our results apply to all languages having an interactive proof system since they have a public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge proof system 2, 19 .
6 Concurrent Zero-Knowledge Arguments with preprocessing
We n o w consider the problem of constructing concurrent perfect zero-knowledge arguments with preprocessing. Speci cally, we show that the protocol in Section 5, when implemented using the perfectly equivocable commitment s c heme in Section 4, allows to obtain concurrent perfect zero-knowledge arguments. Formally, w e a c hieve the following The proof of the above theorem goes along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 3 and therefore we only sketch it, by pointing out the few di erences. First of all, we reduce L to an NP-complete language, say, Hamiltonian Graphs. Then we can use the 3-round public-coin honest-veri er zero-knowledge proof system given in 5 , call it A,B. Starting from this protocol, we construct a protocol P,V as follows. Whenever, during the protocol A,B, A is required to use a computationally equivocable commitment s c heme, we will require A to run the perfectly equivocable commitment s c heme in Section 4. The intuition here, also used in 14 , is that the ability of decommitting each commitment t o mes i as any desired string allows to perform a perfect simulation of protocol A,B without need of a witness for the original input graph. We then have that the soundness holds under the same properties than the binding property of such commitment scheme, that is, the intractability of computing discrete logarithms modulo a prime. The concurrent zero-knowledge property is proved as for Theorem 3. We note that this technique also applies to languages having 3-round public-coin honest-veri er perfect zero-knowledge proof systems as those in 18, 17, 25, 6 , in which case it returns a perfect zero-knowledge argument with preprocessing and with e ciency in terms of communication and computational complexity comparable to the starting protocol. Speci cally, w e do not need any NP reduction during the construction of the protocol, even if we w ant t o r u n a n umberof proofs polynomial in the length of the preprocessing.
